E-bike laws raise civil liberties concerns

The Secretary

State Development, Infrastructure and Works Committee

Parliament House

George Street

Brisbane Qld 4000

sdiwc@parliament.qld.gov.au

Dear Madam

Transport and Other Legislation (Managing E-mobility Use and Protecting Our Communities) Amendment Bill 2026.

Kindly accept this submission in relation to the above Bill.

1.         LIMITED SUBMISSIONS

This submission addresses two aspects of the Bill – parental responsibility and police powers to destroy bikes.

2.         PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK

The relevant sections are set out below:

78D If a child under 16 years commits an offence against section 78B or 84B, a parent of the child is taken to have also committed an offence against section 78B or 84B, as the case may be, and is liable to the same penalty.

(2) However, it is a defence for the parent to prove that—

(a)           the parent did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, of the child's conduct constituting the offence against section 78B or 84B; or

(b)          the parent took all reasonable steps to ensure the child did not engage in the conduct constituting the offence against section 78B or 84B.

(3)     In deciding whether things done or omitted to be done by the parent constitute reasonable steps for subsection (2)(b), a court must have regard to whether the parent was in a position to influence the child's conduct in relation to the offence.

78B A person must not ride an electrically power-assisted cycle or personal mobility device on a road, on a road-related area or in a public place unless the person—

(a)    is at least 16 years; and

(b)    holds either —

(i) a valid Queensland driver licence; or

(ii)            a valid non-Queensland driver licence.

84B A person must not ride a prohibited bike on a road, on a road-related area or in a public place.

The Bill provides that when a child under 16 rides an e-bike or prohibited bike, the parents of that child are presumed to have committed the same offence unless they can prove that they did not and could not have been reasonably expected to know about the child’s conduct, or that they took all reasonable steps to prevent it[1].

This presumption is an excessive departure from the principles of negligence currently governing parental responsibility for the torts of a child and the principle of presumption of innocence more generally, that is unjustified by the nature of the offence. Moreover, given the extent of changes made by the Bill, the imposition of parental responsibility is unnecessary to deter risky behaviour.

We begin by noting what appears to be the irony of a conservative government introducing this type of legislation, since conservatives are usually associated with strong support for the rights of parents to choose how to bring up their children.

These provisions are the product of the report of the Inquiry into e-mobility safety and use in Queensland by the State Development, Infrastructure and Works Committee[2].

The discussion by the Committee in support of its recommendation to impose this liability is desultory. The Committee said at paragraph 8.12: “A significant proportion of submitters proposed that parents of minors using e-mobility devices should be held responsible and accountable for their child’s actions.” The footnote to this sentence lists 20 supporting submissions. There were 1223 submissions. That is hardly a “significant” proportion.

The Committee does not attempt to address the moral and legal policy issues raised by this proposal. We have reviewed the 20 submissions listed - neither do they.

The liability of parents for civil wrongs committed by their children depends on the cause of action.

In trespass, they are not liable. In Mauduoit v Ross[3], Higinbotham J., speaking for the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, said:

The relationship existing between the defendant and the actual wrong-doers must be excluded from consideration in dealing with this question. A father is not legally responsible for his son's trespass, unless the relation of principal and agent exists between them.

In negligence the leading decision is that of the High Court in Smith v. Leurs and Others[4]:

it is incumbent upon a parent who maintains control over a young child to take reasonable care so to exercise that control as to avoid conduct on his part exposing the person or property of others to un-reasonable danger. Parental control, where it exists, must be exercised with due care to prevent the child inflicting intentional damage on others or causing damage by conduct involving unreasonable risk of injury ....

But this is criminal liability.

The law generally does not impose a duty in criminal law to act positively to prevent harm from being caused to others. There are exceptions where legal duties to act have been created[5]. One of these exceptions is where a special or protective relationship exists, such as in the case of a parent in respect of a child. However, that duty entails the prevention of harm being caused to the child.

One of the reasons for not imposing positive criminal law duties is that the corollary of such a duty must be a requirement on the person to either report the person to whom they owe the duty to the police or other authorities or to intervene actively to prevent the commission of an offence. It must be obvious to anyone that a parent reporting their child to the authorities is hardly going to assist with their maintaining a proper relationship with that child and one would think may well result in further delinquent behaviour, not less.

It is the State that has a duty to protect the public from harm.

Presumably this law is intended to deter criminal conduct. However, the liability created here does not depend on the parent having a guilty mind. It imposes strict liability subject to the parent establishing one of the defences.

The explanatory notes justify the reverse onus through the statement that parents are the only people capable of establishing whether or not they took the necessary steps to prevent their child’s misconduct. However, the control a parent has over their child is ultimately limited to limiting access and explaining the rules. Accordingly, a case for parental misconduct can quite easily be built by asking the child where they acquired the bike and if they were aware that they needed a license to ride it, or if it was illegal.

This lack of the need for a guilty mind compares with the situation where the parent counselled or aided or abetted the child in committing the offence. That is a deliberate act, not an omission. The deterrent effect must be reduced where, as is proposed here, no specific intention is required.

In fact, making parents liable may ultimately make already bad relationships worse, particularly where the family is from a disadvantaged background and the parents are already by reason of the stress of living having difficulty maintaining healthy relationships. Many parents face serious challenges, e.g. those of being single parents, or of experiencing poverty or a cost-of-living crisis and thus having to work multiple jobs. Punishing those parents will only exacerbate their problems.

Furthermore, the legislation punishes parents for something their children have already been punished for.

Finally, it is submitted that if this Parliament is to impose a duty upon parents of this nature, then the duty should only apply in circumstances where the child does actual physical harm to a person. As noted above, the duty of care in negligence only applies where harm is done to someone or to property in that case.

The first duty imposed here is, effectively, to ensure that a child does not use an e- bike without the relevant license. But as is well established in civil law[6], the fact that a person does not have a license cannot be pleaded as a particular of negligence in a motor vehicle accident case. This is simply because the fact that you do or you don’t have a license does not prove that you did anything wrong in the management of the vehicle. A person who does not have a license might be a perfectly good driver and equally a person who does have a license might on a particular occasion drive badly or be generally a bad driver. They’re not having a licence, proves nothing necessarily about whether the person caused any particular accident (or other harm).

Finally, we would submit that if a duty is to be imposed, the penalty should not be a fine but an obligation to participate in a counselling program or a program such as the Triple P Parenting Program. This would no doubt do the parent and the child a much better service than fining them, particularly a disadvantaged single parent or someone struggling to pay for the petrol needed to get to work.

3.         SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION POWERS

The Bill gives police powers to seize bikes that they reasonably suspect of being prohibited bikes[7].  While improving enforcement of laws targeting prohibited bikes is a laudable aim, the provisions introduced unreasonably abrogate fundamental rights by supporting warrantless seizure and indefinite holding and constraining owner’s abilities to challenge the decision.

3.1       Reasonable Suspicion

The standard of reasonable suspicion is too low to justify the resulting abrogation of the bike owner’s property rights. As we have previously suggested, the standard of “reasonable suspicion” is a contradictory standard open to abuse. State seizure of personal property that has not been proven to be prohibited should not be carried out so lightly. The Explanatory Notes set out the evidentiary basis that officers are expected to rely on in practice to establish whether or not they believe a device is prohibited as follows[8]:

-    Visual inspection of the device

-    Measurement of wheelbase, width and height

-    Assessment of the device’s unladen weight

-        Existing speed detection provisions to establish the speed at which the device is travelling

-        The testing powers in new section 121A of the TORUM Act, enabling an approved testing device to be used to assess the device’ s maximum design speed.

To reduce the risk that compliant vehicles are seized, these factors should be referenced in s123C as either forming the basis of a reasonable belief about whether or not a vehicle is compliant OR as a set of criteria where at least two of the factors must apply.

3.2       Seizure Notices

When a seizure is from a person in possession of the vehicle, officers are required to give a seizure notice to the person. Notices will note the time and date of seizure, identifying particulars of the vehicle, the owner of the vehicle (if known), the storage location, and requirements for making a release application. If the device is part of a shared-scheme the notice will also be delivered to the provider, and if the device is unmanned at the time of seizure, the notice will be published on the QPS website[9].

For this notice provision to effectively uphold the rule of law, police must state clear and specific grounds for seizure in the notice. Failing to apprise owners of the case against them strips them of their ability to mount a proper defence, permitting police overreach to go unchecked.

For the same reasons, police must also publish notices at the place an unmanned vehicle was seized from as well as online in order to ensure people are properly notified about the seizure. Mere online publication will likely pass unnoticed, whereas, unless the vehicle has been legitimately abandoned, it is likely that owners will return to the site it was left and actually see the notice.

3.3       Lack of Testing

Chapter 4A does not mandate any sort of testing to be done on seized vehicles, permitting indefinite holding by police on suspicion of an offence they can’t be bothered to confirm. It is our submission that this lack of testing requirement will lead to excessive seizure and protracted holding of permitted devices, especially in cases where riders have been observed breaking road rules and the officer wishes to enact stronger punishment.

The Bill clearly contemplates the availability of testing through section 121A[10], which clearly permits officers to take suspected prohibited vehicles from their riders and, using an approved device, test whether or not they are compliant. This is far preferable, prompting efficient resolution of the dispute and, importantly, resting the burden of proof on the party actually in possession of the vehicle. It is practically nonsensical and contrary to fundamental principles of criminal justice that the owner should have to prove their innocence through reference to the material condition of a vehicle that has been taken from them. In cases where there is an identifiable owner, seizure should only be permitted for a set period that is legitimately necessary to test the vehicle’s compliance. Moreover, while certain police stations may not have access to s121A approved testing devices, this should not justify indefinite holding. Testing must be carried out according to the means of the station within the set period, and if non-compliance cannot be proven, the device must be returned. Testing must also be made mandatory for unmanned devices, though a return provision is not practical.

3.4       Challenging Decisions

As alluded to above, the QCCL does not support a law that requires property owners to prove they should be allowed to possess their own personal property. Rather, police must be required to prove the property is illegal, and if they cannot, must return (or in the case of property with an unidentifiable owner) attempt to return the property. Requiring owners to prove their property is legal puts an unreasonable burden on people whose rights have already been interfered with.  The bill gives the example of CCTV footage showing the vehicle was brought to the public place in a lawful way as information that members of the public should be expected to include to establish grounds for release[11]. This form of evidence is not easily accessible to normal members of the public, least of all young people, who are this Bill’s primary target, but is easier for police to access. Overall, the Bill assumes a position of de facto guilt, requiring citizens to discharge heavy evidential burdens to require the return of property that has been taken from them on unreasonable grounds, while the police, who could far more easily access proof, are not even required to undertake a bare minimum investigation to substantiate their claim. That is a manifest injustice.

We thank interns Charlie Barksdale and Falak Ibrahim Shaikh for their contributions to this submission.

We trust this is of assistance to you in your deliberations.

[1] Transport and Other Legislation (Managing E-mobility Use and Protecting Our Communities) Amendment Bill 2026 (Qld) cl 78D (‘The Bill’).

[2]As an aside, we are surprised that this Bill has been referred to the same Committee that prepared the report.

[3] (1884) 10 VLR (L) 264, 266

[4] (1945) 70 C.L.R. 256, 262. per Dixon J

[5] Cf sections 285-290 of the Criminal Code

[6]  Edwards v Weeks 1930 VLR 225, 226

[7] The Bill (n 1) cl 8.

[8] Explanatory Notes (n 2) 5.

[9] The Bill (n 1) cl 8 s123F.

[10] Ibid, cl 40.

[11] Ibid, cl 8, s123G (3).