Public Consultation – Security Camera Systems in Queensland Taxis
Thank you for the opportunity to make comment on the regulation of security cameras in Queensland taxis.
First principles
The Council takes the view that a taxi cab as a public conveyance is a public place.
In the Council’s view the use of surveillance cameras in a public place raises significant issues of privacy.
The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties endorses the view of Mr Alan Borvoy, General Counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association that ‘Citizens in a free country should have a presumptive right to get lost. We should be able to wander around without government keeping tabs on us.’
The Council specifically rejects the argument that ‘If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about.’ In fact, the Council takes the opposite view that ‘Nobody has nothing to hide.’ There are many people who for totally legitimate reasons might want to get lost. For example, the victims of sexual abuse have every reason to change their identities and not be identified. The assertion that the ‘innocent have nothing to hide’ implies that only those who wish to deceive prize their privacy. In fact, the innocent have plenty of reasons to hide their identity.
The Council is deeply concerned by the ever increasing prevalence of surveillance in our society.
However, the Council does accept that in certain circumstances subject to adequate controls a case may be made for the use of public surveillance.
In this instance the question is to assess whether there are any benefits to be gained from deploying the cameras and to balance those against the costs and dangers.
The potential costs of video surveillance include abuse of the product by government or other officials for private purposes including voyeurism. As part of an ever increasing range of public video surveillance there is a possibility that it will have a profound chilling effect on public life by making people careful about what they read, how they dress and with whom they meet in public.
The safety of drivers
The obvious and compelling case for the introduction of cameras into taxis is that it is to protect drivers.
The Council is a voluntary organisation relying largely upon the unpaid efforts of its members. As a result, we do not have the resources to fully assess the evidence on whether or not the use of cameras in taxis is likely to have a real and significant impact in reducing attacks upon drivers.
However we note in this regard the discussion paper of the British Columbia Motor Carrier Commission on the installation of visual cameras in taxis operating in the lower mainland dated 6 February 2004 which discusses these issues. It concludes there is evidence that cameras will enhance driver safety. The recommendations of this paper are now substantially reflected the British Columbia Passenger Transport Board Rule on taxi cameras in lower mainland taxicabs dated 19 November 2004.
The Manitoba ombudsman in April 2003 concluded that the collection use and disclosure of digital images from taxi cab cameras was authorised and limited to the amount reasonably necessary under that province’s Freedom of Information and Privacy Act. In a press release the ombudsman noted that it would be ‘necessary, effective and proportional to the intrusion into the individual’s privacy in terms of enhancing driver’s safety.’ The ombudsman Mr Tuckett accepted evidence presented by the Taxi Cab Board of Manitoba that there were serious threats to drivers which could be effectively deterred by the use of the cameras to identify assailants and was satisfied there were no other measures which provided the necessary protection.
As noted above the Council has no independent means of assessing the risk to drivers and the capacity of cameras to minimise or reduce those risks. However, we see no reason to think that conditions in Manitoba or British Columbia are likely to be significantly different from those in Queensland. Therefore, we are prepared to proceed on the basis that cameras are an appropriate response to the need to provide drivers with safety. However, we are of the view that the use of these cameras needs to be subject to stringent controls to prevent the misuse of the information obtained.
Draft Regulation
In our view the Draft Regulation is seriously deficient.
In our view the principles by which the regulations are to be judged are well set out on page 10 of the British Columbia Discussion Paper. They are:
1. Access to pictures
1.1 Restricted to authorised Law Enforcement Officers (i.e. Police);
1.2 Incident Driven;
1.3 Used for investigation of criminal offences;
1.4 The system must be tamper proof so that neither companies nor drivers can manipulate it;
1.5 Wireless downloads (even by Police) and any form of real time monitoring must be prohibited.
2 Retention of Images
2.1 Unused images must be either destroyed or overwritten without providing an opportunity to view the images;
2.2 Cameras must have digital still imaging (not video) where images are recorded on two way (rewritable loop) and erase automatically unless Police are investigating a criminal offence;
2.3 Passengers must be informed that they are being videoed;
2.4 Cameras must be prohibited from having an auditory capacity.
We now apply these principles to the draft regulations. In our view given that the purpose of these cameras is to protect the safety of the drivers the only person who should be entitled to access the product of these cameras should be the Police for the purposes of investigating an offence either under the Criminal Code or the Summary Offences Act. In the case of offences against persons other than the driver or a passenger a warrant should be required. On this basis the authorised purposes in the draft are too wide.
Obviously the Council approves the proposal for there to be signs on taxis advising hirers of the existence of the system. In addition, the Council approves of there being a penalty for the unauthorised use of images recorded on the security camera system.
In the Council’s view, following on its view of the purposes for which the images can be used, Regulation 33M is probably satisfactory except that it should make clear that the images are to be destroyed after all levels of appeal have been exhausted.
The Council commends to the Department the list of important factors contained in pages 12 and 13 of the British Columbia Discussion Paper and the list of requirements be imposed upon taxi operators set out on page 14.
Finally, the Council is most impressed by the programming parameters set out on page 21 of the Discussion Paper and commends them to the Department. These now form part of the Rule referred to above.
Enforcement
Whilst the Council has already noted the creation of various offences for failing to comply with the legislation it takes the view that this is an inadequate mechanism.
The Council repeats the calls that it has made on numerous occasions over the last 10 years for the introduction of Comprehensive Privacy Legislation in Queensland.
In particular that legislation would need to provide for appropriate compensation mechanisms either by a Privacy Commissioner or by means of a civil cause of action for damages. In the absence of either of these the enforcement mechanism proposed in the draft regulations is inadequate.